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I. INTRODUCTION
Hazardous waste disposal sites pose severe risks to public
health.' Consequently, states regulate the handling of toxic sub-
stances.2 The cost of complying with these environmental regula-
tions can be staggering.' Voluntary bankruptcy becomes an
attractive alternative to a company unable to afford environmental
compliance costs.4 Bankruptcy law offers a temporary delay of the
enforcement of most claims against the debtor and provides for an
orderly and prioritized distribution of the debtor's assets to its
creditors.' Moreover, it permits less than one hundred percent re-
1. See, e.g., Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-2(a) (West
1982).
2. See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
3. The Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that the cleanup cost for
1,200-2,000 of the most dangerous hazardous waste sites would cost between 13.1 and 22
billion dollars. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120, 6123. Additionally, the Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management stated that the new environ-
mental regulations have forced storage costs for hazardous chemical waste from approxi-
mately 24 dollars per barrel in the late 1970's to a present cost of 100 dollars per barrel.
Marcus, The Recycling of Chemical Waste, N.Y. Times, January 8, 1984, § 3, at 4, col. 3.
See also Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: An Emerging Conflict, 13 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,099 (April 1983) [hereinafter Emerging Conflict].
4. See Emerging Conflict, supra note 3, at 10,099-10,100. See also Hoffman, Environ-
mental Protection and Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Toward a Better Compromise, 11
ECOLOGY L.Q. 671, 676 (1984). To file for bankruptcy, an entity does not have to be
legally insolvent. Bankruptcy law allows a solvent business experiencing financial diffi-
culties to file a bankruptcy petition. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 312, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6269 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT];
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5795 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. The entity need only prove that it's debts are
greater than the fair value of all of its assets. 11 U.S.C. § 101(29)(1982 & Supp. III
1985).
5. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (automatic stay provision); 11
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payment of debts. 6 In many instances, this partial payment is con-
sidered payment in full.7
The use of bankruptcy law by debtors confronted with hazard-
ous waste compliance costs may lead to a conflict between the
objectives of federal bankruptcy laws and state environmental pro-
tection legislation. 8 Bankruptcy law provisions may be construed
to allow debtors to avoid compliance with state environmental
laws. Thus, a state's exercise of its police power to protect public
health and safety may be undermined. 9 For example, a bankruptcy
trustee'" may abandon property that is financially burdensome or
of no value to the bankruptcy estate,1 pursuant to section 554 of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended (the "Code").' 2
The abandonment of property encumbered by environmental lia-
bility separates the property from the estate so that the trustee can
liquidate or reorganize the estate without the burden of the liability
attached to the property. '3 State officials, however, have contended
that abandonment under certain circumstances contravenes state
environmental protection laws by leaving property containing toxic
waste unsupervised and by imposing cleanup costs on the state's
U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (priority of asset distribution). One of the primary
benefits of bankruptcy for a debtor is the temporary relief from creditor action provided
by the automatic stay of proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 362, upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition a creditor is stayed from
proceeding to collect money from the debtor except as provided elsewhere in the bank-
ruptcy laws. Id. See also Hoffman, supra note 4, at 676-79 (1984) (discussing the ability
of solvent debtors to take advantage of the Bankruptcy Code).
6. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (setting forth the priority for
claims to receive distribution of property from the bankruptcy estate).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (stating the effect on claims after dis-
charge of a debtor from bankruptcy).
8. See generally Emerging Conflict, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. A bankruptcy trustee "is the representative of the estate" for the benefit of the
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1982). The specific powers of the trustee are enumerated
throughout the Code.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The abandonment of property en-
cumbered by environmental liability separates the property from the estate so that the
trustee can liquidate or reorganize the estate without the burden of the liability attached
to the property. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 554.02[2] at 554-6 (L. King 15th ed.
1987).
12. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), and sections of 2, 7, 12, 15, 17-20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 33, 40-43, 46,
48, and 49 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Bankruptcy Reform Act was amended
by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 and the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
13. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, 554.02[2] at 554-6.
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taxpayers. 14
When such conflicts arise, courts have attempted to balance the
objectives of the Code with those of state environmental laws.' 5 In
an attempt to reconcile bankruptcy abandonment and state envi-
ronmental statutes, the United States Supreme Court in Midlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion ("Quanta")'6 held that a trustee could not abandon property
in contravention of state and local laws aimed at protecting public
health and safety.' 7 The decision, however, was based on question-
able legal analysis and failed to address important issues. These
unaddressed issues include who should pay for the cleanup and
how cleanup orders are to be enforced.' 8
This note first will provide a brief background of the Code and
the concept of abandonment.' 9 It then will discuss state efforts to
protect the environment. 20 Next, it will set forth the factual back-
ground of the Quanta case and analyze the decision of the Supreme
Court.2 ' Finally, this note will explore the questions left unan-
swered by the Court in the Quanta decision.22
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and
the Concept of Abandonment
1. The Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11 and Chapter 7
The Code succeeded the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act")2 3
and constituted the first major change in bankruptcy law in forty
years."4 Congress drafted the Code in response to the inadequacy
14. Brief for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 2, 11, 16-18,
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S.
Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805).
15. See infra notes 202-30 and accompanying text. See also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S.
274 (1985).
16. The court of appeals decision, reported at 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), is cap-
tioned "In re Quanta Resources Corp.". Accordingly, the Supreme Court case is also
generally referred to as the "Quanta" case.
17. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. 755, 762 (1986).
18. The parties considered as potential payors include: the debtor, secured creditors,
unsecured creditors and the taxpayers.
19. See infra notes 23-62 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 77-198 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 199-256 and accompanying text.
23. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-98) (codified at 11 U.S.C. (1976)
(repealed 1979)).
24. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified at 11 U.S.C. (1976) (repealed
1979)), had been the last major bankruptcy legislation before the Code was adopted.
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of the system under the Act.25 Specifically, Congress believed that
the Act underemphasized debtor protection. 26  Accordingly, the
Code emphasizes relief for the consumer-debtor 27 and promotes
business rehabilitation by allowing for the total reorganization of a
failing corporation. 2  The Code's main objectives are to give a
debtor a "fresh start ' 29 and to compensate creditors with an equi-
table distribution of the assets of the estate. 30 The fresh start is
given to a debtor by discharging it from its pre-bankruptcy petition
debts upon completion of the bankruptcy;3' the equitable distribu-
tion of assets is promoted by establishing a priority scheme for pay-
ments to creditors.32
The Code provides for various types of bankruptcy proceed-
ings.33 A corporate debtor may take advantage of either of two
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5965 ("Both substantively and administratively, the bankruptcy system is
straining on all sides to handle situations that the framers of the [Act] never dreamed
would arise").
26. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5966. ("The Bank-
ruptcy Act has not kept pace with the modern consumer credit society").
27. Id. "This bill makes bankruptcy a more effective remedy for the unfortunate
consumer debtor." Id.
28. Chapter 11 of the Code (codified at I I U.S.C. §§ 1100-1174 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)) governs corporate reorganization procedure. The Code also provides for an in-
dependent judiciary, as an arm of the United States District Court, to handle the large
increase in bankruptcy filings. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5965-66.
29. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 118, 128, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6078, 6089. This "fresh start" results from discharging the
debtor from pre-bankruptcy petition debts upon completion of the bankruptcy. Id., re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6089. "This section is the heart of
the fresh start provisions of bankruptcy law." Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6340 (referring to the provision codified at 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). The act of discharge relieves the debtor of all pre-petition debts even though
the liquidation or reorganization plan did not fully recompense the creditors. Id. It is
important to note that there are exceptions to receiving a discharge. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523, 727 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
30. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 165, 372-73, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6126, 6325-29. See also Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. American Savings & Loan Assoc., 804 F.2d 1487, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986) (section
362 of the Code "[S]eeks ... to protect the creditors' rights to equality of distribution
..... "); In re Tenna Corp., 801 F.2d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Congress' concern for
equality of distribution among creditors is obvious").
31. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
33. The Code contains provisions for liquidation (Chapter 7), municipal reorganiza-
tion (Chapter 9), general reorganization (Chapter 11), reorganization for family farmers
(Chapter 12), and reorganization for debtors with a regular income (Chapter 13). In a
Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, virtually all of the debtor's property as of the date of
the bankruptcy petition's filing becomes property of the estate to be liquidated and dis-
tributed to creditors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 704(1), 726 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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types of bankruptcy proceedings: 34 a Chapter 11 reorganization3 5
or a Chapter 7 liquidation. The fresh start concept is not relevant
to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding because a corporate debtor
who has filed a Chapter 7 petition cannot be discharged from its
debts.36 Instead, the primary objective in a corporate liquidation is
to promote fair and efficient distribution of a debtor's assets among
its creditors. 37 To accomplish this goal, a trustee is elected or ap-
pointed to liquidate the debtor's assets and distribute the proceeds
to the debtor's creditors. 3' The Code carefully outlines the
Chapter 9 contains the provisions for the adjustment of debts of a municipality. 11
U.S.C. §§ 901-927 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Chapter 11, providing for general reorgani-
zation, is a combination of Chapters VIII, X, XI and XII of the Act, which provided for
general and railroad reorganization. Chapter 11 also may be used for liquidation pur-
poses. 11 U.S.C. § 1174 (1982). Although the Code seems to suggest that any debtor
eligible for Chapter 7 also is eligible to file under Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), some case law suggests that an individual may not file a personal Chap-
ter 11 petition. See, e.g., Wamsganz v. Boatmen's Bank of De Soto, 804 F.2d 503 (8th
Cir. 1986). In a reorganization, a plan is confirmed to pay pre-petition creditors over
time. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1121-29, 1142, 1143 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Sections
1200-1231, providing reorganization for farmers, were recently added to the Code by the
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088. Finally, Chapter 13 provides for individual reorgani-
zation. Generally, the debtor retains his property and works out a payment plan with his
creditors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1306, 1321 (1982).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
35. In a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding, pre-petition management continues to
operate the debtor's business unless a request is made for the appointment of a trustee. 11
U.S.C. § 1104 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). When the debtor continues to operate the busi-
ness he is commonly referred to as a debtor-in possession. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1982
& Supp. III 1985). While the business continues to operate, the debtor drafts a plan
setting forth a method for distributing assets to creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129 (1982
& Supp. III 1985). If the debtor fails to file a plan, other parties in interest may do so. 11
U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Certain creditors and the court must then
approve the plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). (The complex proce-
dure involved in the drafting and seeking approval of a plan is beyond the scope of this
note.) After the court confirms the plan, with minor exceptions, the debtor is discharged
from its pre-petition debts and the company is given a "fresh start." It may then operate
as if it had not filed for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Of
course, the debtor must operate its business in compliance with the plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1142 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)(1982 & Supp. III 1985). The section provides that "[t]he
court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless the debtor is not an individual .. ." Id.
37. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 726 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also supra note 30 and ac-
companying text.
38. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). An interim trustee is appointed
at the commencement of the proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The
interim trustee may be succeeded by a permanent trustee elected by the debtor's un-
secured creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The interim trustee becomes
the permanent trustee if no permanent trustee is elected. 11 U.S.C. § 702(d) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
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trustee's powers and duties to accomplish this objective.39 For ex-
ample, under the Code a trustee is given the authority to release
valueless property from the debtor's estate.4° This practice is
known as "abandonment".
2. The Evolution of Abandonment
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained limited provisions gov-
erning abandonment.4' A trustee could exercise the abandonment
power only under limited circumstances in a reorganization pro-
ceeding.4 2 Eventually, courts expanded the situations in which a
trustee could abandon property that was non-beneficial to the es-
tate.43 By allowing the abandonment of property that was of no
value to the estate or that was draining the estate's assets, courts
enabled trustees to increase the funds available for distribution to
creditors.'
This judicially created power of abandonment was not unquali-
fied. Courts imposed conditions on the trustee's power to abandon
39. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 704-728 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 28 U.S.C. § 959 (1982).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The section provides as follows:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." Id.
41. See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-98) (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 64(a)(4), 70(a)(2), 70(b), (1976) (repealed 1979)). The trustee could only abandon
property which was burdened by taxes, applications for patents, copyrights or trade-
marks. Id. at §§ 64(a)(4); 70(a)(2). The trustee could also abandon executory leases. Id.
at § 70(b). The term "executory contract" is not defined in the Act or the Code. An
executory contract, however, generally is defined as a contract not completely performed
by one side. See National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
522, n.6 (1984) (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6303-04; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 581, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5844. See also 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MAN-
UAL 70.28 at 1009 (W. Hill, L. King, W. Laube 2d ed. 1978). Under the Act, the
trustee was allowed to consider the benefit of the contract to the estate and assume or
reject it. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-98) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 70b
(1976) (repealed 1979)). If the trustee rejected the contract the rejected party could then
proceed against the estate as a creditor for the amount of his damages. Fletcher v.
Suprite, 180 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1950).
42. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-98) (codified at II U.S.C. §§ 77, 187
(1976) (repealed 1979)).
43. Based on the right to reject executory contracts, the courts began to allow the
rejection of other property from the estate. See, e.g., American File Co. v. Garrett, 110
U.S. 288, 295 (1884) ("[A]ssignees were not bound to accept property of onerous or un-
profitable character."); Federal Land Bank v. Nalder, 116 F.2d 1004, 1007 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 578 (1941) (trustee may "decline to accept" or abandon burden-
some property); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 763, 303 U.S. 636 (1938) (trustee need not accept, or may abandon,
burdensome property).
44. 4 COLLIER ON BANKR., supra note 11, T 554.01 at 554-3.
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property when competing public interests were present.4 5 Begin-
ning with In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co. ,46 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the trustee of a debtor transit
company could not cease operation of a branch railway line when
local law required continued operation.47 The court permitted the
unexpired lease to be rejected but conditioned the rejection on
compliance with state law. 48 Subsequently, in Ottenheimer v. Whit-
aker,49 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that,
in liquidating the estate of a barge company, the bankruptcy
trustee could not abandon several barges when the abandonment
would have resulted in the obstruction of a navigable passage in
violation of federal law.50 Finally, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc.,5 the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania re-
quired a debtor to seal underground steam lines before abandoning
them.52 The court reasoned that this was necessary to safeguard
the public welfare.53
In contrast to the judicially created abandonment power, Con-
gress codified the concept of abandonment in the Code without
express qualification. 4 Section 554(a) of the Code provides that
"[a]fter notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any prop-
erty of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of in-
consequential value and benefit to the estate."'5 5 The legislative
history to section 554 of the Code further suggests that Congress
intended to grant a trustee the unqualified power to abandon such
property.56
The Code also altered the effect abandonment had regarding title
to the debtor's property in a bankruptcy proceeding. Previously,
under the Act, a trustee in a liquidation proceeding was vested
with title to all of the property of the estate. 57 Abandonment
45. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
46. 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942).
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id.
49. 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).
50. Id. at 290.
51. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 277 (CRR) (Bankr. E.D. Pa. November 7, 1974).
52. Id. at 280.
53. Id.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Unqualified abandonment is procedur-
ally governed by Bankruptcy Rule 6007. Bankr. R. 6007.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
56. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6333.
57. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-98) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 70(a)
(1976) (repealed 1979)).
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divested the trustee of the title and revested it in the debtor.58
Under the Code, however, the trustee never assumes title to the
assets of the estate;59 he merely controls the assets for liquidation
purposes."° Therefore, abandonment simply divests the trustee of
control of the property. 61 The debtor retains all title and claims to
the property as he did before filing the bankruptcy petition.62
B. State Environmental Law
Notwithstanding the benefit to creditors of ridding the estate of
property which is draining available assets, state officials have
raised the issue of whether use of the abandonment power to aban-
don property contaminated with hazardous waste violates state en-
vironmental laws. 3  Many states have enacted environmental
protection statutes in response to increased concern regarding haz-
ardous waste pollution.' State legislatures have recognized that
generation, storage, disposal, and possible mismanagement of haz-
ardous substances threatens the well-being of the state's residents
and the environment.65 State environmental regulatory agencies,
therefore, have been created to control and monitor any facility,
person, or action connected with hazardous waste that might pose
a threat to the environment.66
58. If the debtor was a corporation, the property reverted back to the corporate shell.
In contrast, if the debtor was an individual, the property became that individual's free
and clear of the bankruptcy proceeding. Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602 (1937);
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
763, 303 U.S. 636 (1938).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
61. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKR. supra note 11, 554.02(2) at 554-6. The trustee aban-
dons the property to "any party with a possessory interest", usually the debtor. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6333; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5878.
62. Mason v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cir.
1980); In re Tarpley, 4 Bankr. 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
63. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
64. See e.g., Water Pollution Control Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-416 to -
471 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); Hazardous Waste Management Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 299.501-.551 (West 1984); Hazardous Waste Management Act, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN §§ 147-A:1-20 (Supp. 1986); Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN § 58:10-23.11 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); Collection, Treatment & Disposal
of Refuse and Other Solid Waste, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0101 to-1321
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). The Federal government also has enacted substantial
legislation. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-2 (West 1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 27-0900 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
66. In New Jersey the state legislature passed the Solid Waste Management Act (the
"New Jersey Act"). N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 13:1E-1-176 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). The
1987] Midlantic National Bank 1217
These regulatory agencies monitor the facilities and entities asso-
ciated with them through licensing and reporting requirements. 67
Failure to procure a license or breach of a licensing agreement with
a state environmental regulatory agency constitute violations of
state statutes. 68 The unlawful disposal69 or discharge7" of hazard-
ous waste, or personal or property damage caused by spills or dis-
posal also may lead to sanctions.' The sanctions for statutory
violations include liability for cleanup costs, 72 injunctive relief,73
fines, 74 or possible imprisonment. 75 To date, nine states have en-
acted provisions permitting the state to recoup cleanup costs from
the responsible party if the state has had to undertake the cleanup
itself.7 6
purpose of the N.J. Act is to provide a cohesive framework to govern the collection,
disposal and use of solid waste products. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-2 (West 1982). In
New York, the legislature passed the Industrial Waste Management Act (the "New York
Act"). N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0900 to-0925 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1987). The purpose of the N.Y. Act is to regulate the management, generation, storage,
transportation, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 27-0900 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-422
(West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-A:13-a (Supp. 1986).
67. The New Jersey Act, for example, provides that the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection has the authority to regulate and provide registration require-
ments for solid waste collection and disposal facilities and operations. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:1E-2 (West 1982). The N.Y. Act provides standards applicable to generators, trans-
porters, owners and operators of hazardous waste products and facilities and requires
permits to be acquired for storage, transportation, treatment or disposal of hazardous
waste. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-2707, -2709, -2711, -2713 (McKinney 1984
& Supp. 1987). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-430; -450 (West 1985); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.509, .522, .537 (West 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-
A:4, :11 (Supp. 1986).
68. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0913, 71-2705 (McKinney 1984 &
Supp. 1987).
69. See, e.g., MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-224 (1982 & Supp. 1986); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2713 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
70. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-451(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 l(c) (West 1982).
71. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E § 5 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 466.205 (1985).
72. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-451(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); MD.
HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-221 (1982 & Supp. 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 21E § 5 (West Supp. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (Supp. 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11c (West 1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 71-2705 (Mc-
Kinney 1984 & Supp. 1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.22 (Page Supp. 1985); OR.
REV. STAT. § 466.205 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-202 (Supp. 1986).
73. See, e.g., MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-263 (1982 & Supp. 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-9 (West 1982).
74. See, e.g., MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-266 (1982 & Supp. 1986); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2705 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
75. See, e.g., MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-265 (1982 & Supp. 1986); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2705 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
76. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); MD.
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III. THE QUANTA CASE
A. Factual Background
Quanta Resources Corporation ("Quanta Resources" or the
"Debtor") 77 processed waste oil at facilities located in both New
York and New Jersey.78 The New Jersey facility was operated pur-
suant to a temporary operating permit issued by the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (the "NJDEP"). 79  In
June of 1981 the NJDEP discovered that Quanta Resources had
violated a covenant of its operating permit by accepting more than
400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with a highly toxic carcinogen,
PCB. The NJDEP therefore, ordered Quanta Resources to cease
operations. 8° Both parties then entered into negotiations concern-
HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-266 (1982 & Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 21E § 13 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.543 (West 1984); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 If(West Supp.
1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.22 (Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 466.205
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209 (Supp. 1986). In all of these states, except Michi-
gan, the statutes enable the state to obtain a lien against the decontaminated property for
the amount owed for the cleanup. Michigan allows for cleanup costs expended by the
state to be assessed against the site and collected and treated like state taxes. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.543 (West 1984).
In the five states where the state may acquire a lien to recoup cleanup costs expended,
the lien is accorded "super-priority" over other liens on the property. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 22a-452(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E
§ 13 (West Supp. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 58:10-23.1 If (West Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209 (Supp. 1986).
The enactment of state super-priority lien statutes covering environmental cleanup costs
directly conflicts with the rights of secured creditors and the statutory priority scheme
contained in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). These super-prior-
ity liens and their potential retroactive application also raise a constitutional issue con-
cerning the impairment of secured creditors' rights. Specifically, the super-priority lien
legislation raises questions under the "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution which provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. A detailed analysis of
this issue is beyond the scope of this note.
77. Quanta Resources Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, was a wholly owned
subsidiary of Quanta Holding Corporation, a subsidiary of Waste Recovery, Inc. Brief
for Trustee at iii n.l, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805).
78. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 757. The property in New York, located in Long Island
City, was owned by the Debtor. Brief for Trustee at iv, Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-
805). The property in New Jersey, located in Edgewater, was leased by the Debtor from
two individuals. Brief for New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 3,
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S.
Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805).
79. Id. at 757.
80. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 757. PCB is the abbreviation for polychlorinated biphenyl,
a toxic element.
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ing clean up of the facility. 8'
While the parties were still negotiating, Quanta Resources filed a
voluntary Chapter 11 reorganization petition in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey.8 2 The NJDEP
issued an administrative order on the following day requiring
Quanta Resources to clean up the site.83 Later, the Debtor con-
verted its reorganization petition to a Chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding. 84
Following Quanta Resources' filing for bankruptcy in New
Jersey, an investigation of the Quanta Resources facility in New
York revealed that the Debtor had accepted and stored more than
70,000 gallons of waste oil, sludge, and other hazardous wastes,
including oil contaminated with PCBs.85 Compounding the prob-
lem, the containers storing the contaminated oil were deteriorating
and the toxic oil was leaking into the soil. 86 An appraisal of the
New York property revealed that the mortgages on the facility's
property exceeded the property's value. 7 The trustee thus con-
cluded that the estimated cost of disposing of the contaminated oil
would be burdensome to the estate and attempted to sell the value-
less property for the benefit of the creditors.88 The attempt to sell
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Section 1112 of the Code allows a Chapter 11 debtor to convert his case to a
Chapter 7 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Such a conversion is
routine unless one of the limitations as specified in the section applies. Id.
85. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. 755, 758 (1986). The State of New York claimed that Quanta
Resources and the bankruptcy trustee possessed and neglected hazardous substances,
thereby endangering the public health and safety. Brief for New York at 2, Midlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755
(1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805).
86. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 758.
87. Id. In the judgment of the appraiser, the buildings on the property had no value
because of their age and deteriorating condition. The appraiser estimated that the fair
market value of the property was $535,000, but stated that for "forced sale" purposes this
value should be discounted by 20% to $428,000. Neither the "fair market" nor the
"forced sale" estimates took into consideration the contaminated state of the property or
the expenditures which would be necessary in order to dispose of the oil on the site and
render the property marketable. Brief for Trustee at 5, Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-
805).
88. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 758. No party to the bankruptcy proceeding disputed that
the site was burdensome and of inconsequential value to the estate. Id. In fact, at the
beginning of the case, the trustee was required to maintain a 24-hour guard service at a
cost to the estate in excess of $1,000 per week. Brief for Trustee at 5, Midlantic National
Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986)
(Nos. 84-801, 84-805). At the abandonment hearing the trustee testified that he person-
ally had borrowed $20,000, most of which had gone to pay for the 24-hour security. Id.
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the property, however, was unsuccessful. Subsequently, the trustee
notified the creditors and the bankruptcy court that he would
abandon the property if he did not receive an offer to purchase the
property for a price in excess of the liens against it.89 Both the
State of New York and New York City objected to the trustee's
proposal, claiming that abandonment would threaten the pubic's
health and safety and would violate state environmental laws.9"
The bankruptcy court, however, approved the abandonment,
noting that the State of New York was better equipped to clean up
the site than the trustee. 9' This decision was affirmed by the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.92 The
State of New York appealed the district court's decision to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit but proceeded to decontam-
inate the facility, except the polluted subsoil, at a cost of approxi-
mately $2.5 million. 93  A divided panel94 for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's
decision.9 5 The court concluded that Congress intended to codify
the judicial exceptions to unqualified abandonment, conditioning
89. Brief for Trustee at 5, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805). Greenpoint Oil
Corporation ("Greenpoint") offered to purchase the property, subject to the mortgages
and other liens, for $3,000. The offer was approved by the bankruptcy court. Greenpoint
subsequently withdrew its offer because of the hazardous conditions and violations ex-
isting at the property of which Greenpoint was not aware at the time of the offer. Id.
90. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 758. New York rested its objection on public policy consid-
erations reflected in applicable local laws and Title 28, Chapter 959 of the United States
Code, which requires a trustee's compliance with state law when managing or operating
property in his possession as a trustee. Id.
91. Id. Shortly after the bankruptcy court approved the abandonment of the New
York site, the trustee gave notice of his intent to abandon the personal property at the
New Jersey site, consisting mainly of the contaminated oil. Id. Because the New Jersey
site was leased by the Debtor the application was limited to the personal property at the
site. Although the NJDEP objected that the estate had sufficient funds to protect the
public from the dangers posed by the hazardous waste, the bankruptcy court approved
the abandonment. Id. Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New York
facilities raised similar issues and the New York case already was pending before the
court of appeals the parties in the New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a
direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to the court of appeals. The direct appeal was
taken pursuant to Section 405 (c)(1)(B) of the Code. Id. at 759.
92. Id. at 758. The district court opinion is unpublished.
93. Id. Upon abandonment the trustee also removed the 24-hour guard service that
had been hired and shut down the fire-suppression system operating at the site. Id.
94. In his dissent, Judge Gibbons argued that the codification of the power of aban-
donment in the Code permitted abandonment without exception. In re Quanta Re-
sources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The dissent
also noted there were Takings Clause implications raised by the majority's holding. Id. at
924-25.
95. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. 755, 759 (1986). See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
912 (3d Cir. 1984).
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or disallowing abandonment when important public interests were
present. 96 The trustee responded to the appellate court decision by
filing a petition for rehearing with the court of appeals.97 After the
petition was denied, Midlantic National Bank, a creditor of the
Debtor, applied to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, which was granted on February 19, 1985.98
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the court of appeals decision. 99 The Court held that Con-
gress did not intend section 554(a) of the Code to preempt all state
and local laws."° Specifically, the Court held that the bankruptcy
court did not have the power to authorize abandonment of prop-
erty containing toxic waste without imposing conditions on the
abandonment that would adequately protect the public's health
and safety. 101
The Court's decision was based on four conclusions. First, the
Court determined that Congress intended to codify the pre-Code,
judicially restricted doctrine of abandonment. 10 2  Second, the
Court noted that other sections of the Code were expressly
subordinate to laws designed to promote public health and
safety. °3 Third, the Court concluded that section 959(b) of Title
28 of United States Code ("section 954(b)"), which requires that a
bankruptcy trustee manage the bankrupt estate in accordance with
state law, supported a finding that Congress did not intend the
Code to preempt state law.104 Finally, the Court stated that Con-
96. In re Quanta, 739 F.2d at 923. The court of appeals remanded both cases back to
the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. Id.
97. Brief for Trustee at 9, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805).
98. 469 U.S. 1207 (1985). At the time the petition for certiorari was filed the admin-
istration of the Debtor's estate was virtually complete. All assets, other than those aban-
doned by the trustee were liquidated. Distribution was made to the secured creditors at
the time the assets securing their liens were sold, and administrative expenses incurred by
the trustee were paid to the extent funds were available. Brief for Trustee at 9, Midlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755
(1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805).
99. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
100. Id. at 762.
101. Id. The Court failed, however, to indicate whether adequate protection must
rise to the state statutory standards.
102. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
1987] 1221
Loyola University Law Journal
gress recognized the importance of environmental protection, not-
ing the numerous statutes passed by Congress to protect the
environment and public health and safety.10 5
The Court began its analysis by stating that the pre-Code, judi-
cially created doctrine limiting abandonment power to protect le-
gitimate state or federal interests doctrine was a well-recognized
judicial doctrine that Congress intended to codify in section 554(a)
of the Code."0 6 The Court reasoned that, in accordance with rules
of statutory construction, a statute should not be interpreted as
inconsistent with a judicially created concept unless Congress spe-
cifically provides that the statute is intended to change the judicial
interpretation. 07
The Court further concluded that Congress did not intend to
give a bankruptcy court "carte blanche" to ignore non-bankruptcy
law. 0 8 The Court noted that section 362 of the Code, which pro-
vides that all proceedings against a debtor are stayed once a bank-
ruptcy petition is filed, does not prevent the government from
continuing to sue the debtor to protect public health and safety. 0 9
In support, the Court specifically referred to the exception found in
section 362(b)(5) of the Code, which permits the government to
enforce non-monetary judgments against a debtor's estate. 110
Looking to the legislative history of this section, the Court indi-
cated that the exception applies when a governmental unit sues a
debtor for violation of state regulatory laws."' The Court rea-
soned that, because Congress expressly limited other powers of the
trustee when the public's health and welfare were concerned, Con-
gress presumably intended to similarly restrict the trustee's aban-
donment power. 112 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress
could not have intended to discard prior judicial restrictions on
abandonment when enacting the Code. The Court also cited its
decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco &
105. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
106. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 759-60.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 760.
109. Id. at 760-61 (citing section 362(b)(5) of the Code).
110. Id. at 761. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources,
733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). But see In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated,
459 U.S. 1167 (1983).
111. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. 755, 761 (1986) (citing HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 343,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6299; SENATE REPORT, supra note
4, at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5838.
112. Id. at 760.
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Bildisco, 1 13 as authority for the proposition that filing a bankruptcy
petition does not relieve a debtor from all of its non-bankruptcy
law obligations. 114
As additional evidence that Congress did not intend the Code to
preempt state law, the Court referred to section 959(b), which re-
quires that a bankruptcy trustee manage and operate the property
of the estate without violating state law." 5 The Court acknowl-
edged that Section 959(b) did not directly apply to section 554(a)
of the Code, but maintained that it provided further support for
the proposition that Congress intended to limit the Code's preemp-
tion of state laws." 16
Finally, the Court stated that Congress emphasized the goal of
protecting the environment against toxic pollution by enacting sev-
eral federal statutes to promote this goal." 7 The Court reasoned
that these statutes further evidenced Congress' intent to limit the
bankruptcy trustee's abandonment power when it contravenes
state and local environmental protection laws." 8
2. Dissent
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, began his criticism of the ma-
jority opinion by stressing that the language of section 554(a) of the
Code is absolute, and the only limitation on the trustee's abandon-
ment power is that the property is valueless or otherwise burdens
the estate. "I He also argued that the cases relied on by the major-
ity as evidence of a judicially created exception to the trustee's
abandonment power failed to support the majority's holding. 20
113. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
114. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 760.
115. Id. at 761-62.
116. Id. at 762.
117. Id. The Court cited to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Quanta, 106 S. Ct. 755, 762 (1986).
118. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 762.
119. Id. at 763-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent authored by Justice Rehn-
quist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor. Id. at 763.
120. Id. at 764-65. The dissent distinguished the cases relied on by the majority. Id.
First, the dissent pointed out that in Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.
1952), the court dealt with a conflict between a judicial interpretation of the Act and
another federal statute, not a conflict between state and federal law. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at
764-765 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Next, the dissent noted that in In re Lewis Jones,
Inc., I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 277 (CRR) (Bankr. E.D. Pa. November 7, 1974), the decision was
also based on an interpretation of the judge-made nature of the abandonment power, not
a codified abandonment power. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 765 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Finally, the dissent notes in In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert.
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The dissent further contended that the majority's reliance on sec-
tion 362(b)(5) of the Code, the automatic stay exception, was mis-
placed because this provision demonstrated that Congress made
express exceptions for state police power whenever it intended to
subordinate to state law the rights of the trustee.'"' Therefore, Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued that the absence of an express exception in-
dicated that Congress only intended to restrict the trustee's power
if the property was not of value to the estate. 122
Next, the dissent addressed the NJDEP's argument that the
bankruptcy court may use its equitable powers to support an ex-
ception to abandonment that would contravene state law. 12 3 Justice
Rehnquist stated that a bankruptcy court could not use its equity
power, even to enforce sound public policy, at the expense of the
interests the Code was designed to protect. 124 The dissent then con-
cluded that forcing the trustee to expend the estate's assets to clean
up the sites would contradict the Code's purposes. 25
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the Court's concern that aban-
donment may increase the dangers resulting from toxic waste, but
suggested that notification requirements connected with abandon-
ment would give state authorities adequate opportunity to prevent
the aggravation. 126  The dissent conceded, however, the court
denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942), the propriety of conditioning abandonment was not before
the court of appeals. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 765 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
121. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. 755, 766 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 766-67. Section 105(a) of the Code gives a bankruptcy court power to take
any action necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Code. 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This section is generally construed to mean that a
bankruptcy court is a court of equity. In re Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir.
1986); In re Ranch House of Orange Brevard, Inc., 773 F.2d 1166, 1169 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
See also Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (finding the same equity
principle in the Act). As a court of equity, the bankruptcy court has broad remedial
powers and may look to substance, rather than form, to devise an appropriate remedy
when the remedy at law is inadequate. Chinichian, 784 F.2d at 1443; Ranch House, 773
F.2d at 1169.
124. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 766 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Bankruptcy courts are
courts of equity. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Therefore, in accordance
with the goals of a Chapter 7 proceeding, equitable distribution of the estate to creditors
should be weighed heavily against any competing interests. The bankruptcy court must
weigh the equities in light of the goals which the Code seeks to advance. National Labor
Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
125. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 766.
126. Id. at 767. Section 554(a) of the Code provides for abandonment only after
notice and a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Further, Bankruptcy
Rule 6007 also requires the trustee or debtor-in-possession to give notice to all parties in
interest prior to abandonment. Bankr. R. 6007(a). Justice Rehnquist suggests, that upon
notice, the state authorities could secure the danger posed by the site. Midlantic National
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could narrowly restrict a trustee's abandonment if the abandon-
ment would create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be
uniquely able to prevent. 27
Finally, the dissent noted the majority had failed to acknowledge
that the states' interests extended beyond protecting public health
and safety, and included protecting the public coffers. 28 The dis-
sent reasoned that, by prohibiting abandonment and forcing a
cleanup, the states' interests in protecting the public coffers would
be placed ahead of the claims of the other creditors, a result Con-
gress could not have intended.' 29
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
The dangers posed by hazardous toxic waste are great. It is,
however, Congress' role, and not that of the courts, to decide
whether state environmental protection interests should prevail
over the Code's objectives. Congressional concern with environ-
mental protection is not disputed, particularly in light of the vast
federal legislation on the subject. This concern, however, should
not lead the judiciary to legislate exceptions to an unqualified stat-
ute. '3 The Court's holding in Quanta, which limited a trustee's
abandonment power because of a toxic waste danger, may have
been based on good public policy. Nevertheless, it was not consis-
tent with Congressional intent in enacting section 554(a) of the
Code.' 3' The Quanta holding, therefore, conflicts with Congress'
Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 767 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 767. Justice Rehnquist referred to the United States' Brief
as amicus curiae in which the United States suggested that there might be limits on the
authority of a trustee to abandon dynamite sitting on a furnace in the basement of a
schoolhouse. Id.
128. Id. at 767.
129. Id.
130. See Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 (1981); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424
(1981); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); United States v. Don-
russ Co.. 393 U.S. 297 (1969). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965). The Court, in Griswold noted, "[wie do not sit as a super-legislature to determine
the wisdom, need and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs or
social conditions." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. Moreover, the Court previously disap-
proved of attempts to impose conditions or limitations upon various Code provisions
when the plain reading of the Code sections did not allow for such restrictions. See Ohio
v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 (1985) ("[f]urthermore, it is apparent that Congress . ..
knew how to limit the application of a provision when it desired to do so"); National
Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 (1984) ("[o]bviously
Congress knew how to draft an exclusion ... when it wanted to").
131. In re Union Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 49 Bankr. 477, 478 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985)
(rejecting the third circuit Quanta majority decision and adopting the opinion of the dis-
1987] 1225
1226 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 18
objectives in enacting the Code.
A. Statutory Interpretation
A straightforward analysis of section 554(a) reveals that the
trustee's abandonment power was intended to be unqualified.
When statutory interpretation is required, a court's function is to
give effect to Congress' intent.'32 Under recognized rules of statu-
tory construction, such intent is determined by first looking to the
statute's language. 3 3 If a statute is unclear on its face a court
should then look to its legislative history to aid in the interpreta-
tion of the express language. 34 The language of section 554(a) of
the Code is absolute.' 35 It provides for no exceptions to the
trustee's abandonment power. 36 The trustee need only prove that
the property is "burdensome" or of "inconsequential value and
benefit" to the estate.'37 In Quanta, there was no dispute that the
hazardous waste sites were valueless and burdensome to the estate,
and that the trustee did not have sufficient assets available to fi-
nance a cleanup of the Quanta Resources sites. 138  These costs
would have far exceeded the property's value once it was returned
to an uncontaminated state. 39 Therefore, based on the express
language of the statute, the trustee should have been allowed to
sent). If Congress' policies conflict with one another Congress must prioritize or synthe-
size them. The courts can do so only to the extent provided for by the legislature. The
courts cannot legislate. See infra note 130.
132. United States v. Agrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1982). See also
2A N.J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 and cases cited
therein (Sands 4th ed. 1984).
133. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 480
(1981); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). See also SINGER, supra note
132, at § 46.01 and cases cited therein.
134. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); United States v. Donruss Co., 393
U.S. 297, 303 (1969). See also Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); Tennes-
see Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978); American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organization v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
135. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
136. Id. See also Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 764 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) in which the
dissent noted that there is no legislative history which suggests that Congress intended to
limit the trustee's power in any other way. The dissent found no evidence that Congress
intended to codify prior case law when it enacted section 554(a) of the Code. Quanta,
106 S. Ct. at 764. Further, the dissent noted that the Court previously had been unwill-
ing to read into unqualified statutory language exceptions or limitations based upon legis-
lative history unless the legislative history clearly demonstrated such intent. Id. (citing
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984)).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
138. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 758.
139. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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abandon the sites. 140
Because the language of section 554(a) of the Code is clear on its
face, the Quanta Court erred in looking to the statute's legislative
history. I ' Assuming, however, that the Court was justified in ana-
lyzing the section's legislative history, the Court should have
heeded its previous acknowledgement that only a clear showing of
contrary intent in the legislative history would justify a limitation
on unqualified statutory language. 42 Not only was there no clear
showing of contrary intention in the legislative history of section
554(a) of the Code, but the existing history was minimal, vague,
140. The Court's statutory interpretation has constitutional implications that the ma-
jority failed to address. Specifically, article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution,
known as the "Supremacy Clause", provides that federal law preempts state law when
the two conflict. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law not only explicitly allows the
trustee to abandon any property burdensome to the estate, but also instructs the trustee
to do so as expeditiously as possible. 11 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), 704(1) (1982 & Supp. III
1985). The state environmental laws at issue in Quanta are in direct conflict with Con-
gress' intent because they usurp the bankruptcy court's power by conditioning abandon-
ment on compliance with state environmental laws. Throughout the Code, the
bankruptcy court is entrusted with the power to monitor the trustee's actions in connec-
tion with the property of the estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 364, 554 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). New Jersey law mandates that the trustee consult with the NJDEP before
taking certain actions in connection with the property of the estate. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:lK-9(a) (West Supp. 1986). As a result, the bankruptcy court is no longer reviewing
and ratifying some of the trustee's actions. In effect, the denial of the trustee's right to
abandon results in a distribution of assets among creditors pursuant to state law, not the
Code. Applying the Supremacy Clause, the conflicting state law should not control.
The Court in Quanta, nevertheless, made state-protected common welfare paramount
to the Congress' objectives. The Quanta holding allows the states to require a trustee to
retain and administer valueless and unprofitable property, and, further, requires the es-
tate to pay for the cleanup of the sites with assets which would otherwise be available for
distribution to creditors. These requirements amount to a priority rearrangement in
favor of the states, which is contrary to the express purpose of the Code. As previously
noted, section 726 of the Code governs the order of distribution of property of the estate
in a Chapter 7 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 507 of the
Code governs priorities. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In a case with no
unencumbered assets it is highly unlikely that a general creditor would recover full pay-
ment of its claim. States, by means of their own laws, cannot devise priorities among
creditors of the debtor which the Code does not recognize. Pursuant to the Code the
states are merely unsecured creditors with pre-petition claims against the estate. 11
U.S.C. § 502 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co.,
758 F.2d 137, 139-40 (3d Cir. 1985).
141. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) (absent clear and express legislative intent to the contrary, a statute's language is
conclusive). See also Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 694 F.2d 378, 391
(5th Cir. 1982) ("[B]revity does not necessarily imply ambiguity. When a statute is clear
[the court] should read it to mean what it says, however succinctly").
142. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984). See also Glenn Electric Co.,
Inc. v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (3d Cir. 1985); Local Division 732, Amalga-
mated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 667 F.2d 1327,
1334-35 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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and only indirectly related to the issue of whether abandonment
should be qualified. 143
Despite the unequivocal language of section 554(a) of the Code
and the absence of any contrary legislative history, the Court con-
cluded that Congress intended to incorporate prior case law into
the legislation, including "well-recognized" restrictions on a
trustee's abandonment power.' In the past, the Court has found
it acceptable to incorporate prior case law into enacted legislation
in three instances. The first instance is when Congress has ex-
pressly noted such an intent. 145 The second instance is when Con-
gress re-enacts a statute without change. 4 6  In this situation,
Congress is deemed to have knowledge of judicial interpretations
of the statute prior to its re-enactment and, therefore, the interpre-
tations are deemed adopted in the statute as re-enacted. 4 7 The
third instance is when Congress adopts a new law incorporating
sections of prior law. 4 8 Again, there is a presumption that Con-
gress had knowledge of any judicial interpretation given to the
prior law and therefore the interpretations are deemed incorpo-
rated into the new law. 149
As previously noted, 5 ° there is no indication that Congress ex-
pressly intended to incorporate prior case law when it enacted sec-
tion 554(a) of the Code. In addition, neither of the second two
instances applies to the enactment of section 554(a) of the Code
because, in enacting the section, Congress adopted a new law that
had not previously been codified. Unless the Court has expanded
the rules of statutory construction, there is no authority for the
proposition that Congress should be deemed aware of the prior ju-
dicial interpretation of the non-statutory abandonment rules or
143. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6333; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5878. The legislative history does no more than paraphrase the
codified section. Id. See also United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 310 (1976) (the
absence of specific legislative history does not negate the court's duty to give meaning to
the language of the statute "in light of the evident legislative purpose in enacting the law
in question").
144. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
145. Id. at 764 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the dissent expressed the Court's previous
unwillingness to limit statutory language absent a clear mandate by Congress). See also
supra note 130 and accompanying text.
146. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); Singer, supra
note 140, at § 49.09 and cases cited therein.
147. Id.
148. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978).
149. Id.
150. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
1228 [Vol. 18
Midlantic National Bank
that the prior common law principles should be deemed to be in-
corporated into new legislation.
To arrive at the conclusion that Congress incorporated the pre-
Code abandonment doctrine into section 554 of the Code, the
Court relied on only one case, Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Translantique.'s' In that case, the Court concluded that Congress
intended for judicial doctrine to be incorporated into a statute
when enacting an "important and controversial change" in existing
law, unless Congress explicitly stated otherwise.' 52 The Edmonds
case, however, does not support the majority's interpretation of
section 554 of the Code because, although unqualified abandon-
ment was not codified in the Act, 153 the general concept of aban-
donment had long been accepted. 15' The enactment of section
554(a) of the Code was not, therefore, a codification of a controver-
sial change in existing law.
Finally, the majority's "well-recognized" abandonment restric-
tion is based on only three cases, none of which are premised on
statutory abandonment. 55 The three pre-Code cases involved rep-
resent judicially-created doctrine; and the absence of a statutory
abandonment provision considerably influenced each of the courts
in reaching the decision to limit the trustee's abandonment
power."5 6 Codification of an abandonment rule, unqualified in its
terms, addresses the concerns of these early court decisions. Con-
gress' enactment of section 554(a) of the Code and its failure to
include exceptions, despite including them elsewhere in the
Code,5 7 indicates that Congress did not intend a limited applica-
tion of section 554(a) of the Code.
The Court's statutory interpretation simply is not consistent
with the Code's mandates and objectives. A trustee has a duty to
151. 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
152. Id. at 266-67.
153. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
154. Id.
155. See In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 683 (1942); Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952); In re Lewis
Jones, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 277 (CRR) (Bankr. E.D. Pa. November 7, 1974). The
dissent contended that even if the cases were supportive of the majority, three isolated
cases did not constitute settled law for purposes of assuming that Congress intended to
codify them absent some expression of this intent. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 765 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., Chicago Rapid Transit, 129 F.2d at 5; Ottenheimer, 198 F.2d at 290.
The court in Chicago Rapid Transit recognized that Congress could preempt state regula-
tion via legislation, but held that, absent such a mandate in "fit language", state regula-
tions will prevail over the abandonment power. Chicago Rapid Transit, 129 F.2d at 5.
157. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 362(b), 522(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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reduce the debtor's property to cash as quickly as possible to se-
cure funds for distribution to the creditors in accordance with the
Code.'58 Abandonment serves the creditors' interests by expedi-
tiously obtaining a fair amount in settlement of their claims. 5 9 If
the trustee is prohibited from abandoning burdensome or valueless
property from the estate, assets will be drained from the estate and
the creditors will receive less. By limiting the trustee's abandon-
ment power when Congress did not do so, the Court has effectively
amended the Code in a manner that conflicts with the goal of fair
and equitable distribution to creditors.
B. Code Deference to State Police Power
Environmental and hazardous waste problems existed long
before Congress enacted the Code. Given the numerous federal
statutes concerned with such issues, Congress obviously knew of
them at the time it drafted the Code. 6 ° Accordingly, Congress
could have provided an exception to section 554(a) of the Code by
prohibiting abandonment of property containing hazardous waste
that threatened public health. As the Quanta Court noted in an
earlier case, Congress has limited the application of other bank-
ruptcy provisions. 161
The majority cited section 362(b)(5) of the Code as an example
of Congressional intent to subordinate the Code to a state's power
to protect public health and safety. 162 Section 362(b)(5) of the
Code, however, illustrates that Congress provides an exception
when it intends that an exception apply. 163 The absence of such an
exception in section 554(a) of the Code, therefore, suggests that the
right to abandon is not subject to any public health and safety
exception.
The Court also looked to Section 959(b) as further support for
158. II U.S.C. § 704 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
159. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984).
160. Reflecting a growing anxiety about the threat that hazardous chemicals pose to
the public health and environment Congress, in the past ten years, has enacted several
new statutes and amended existing ones. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA) Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613; Air Pollution Prevention and
Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Water Pollution Prevention and
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
161. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 (1985).
162. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 761.
163. See Id. at 766 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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its holding. The Court reasoned that Section 959(b) supported its
conclusion that Congress did not intend the Code to preempt all
state laws."6 The section states that "a trustee . . . shall manage
and operate the property in his possession as such trustee . . . ac-
cording to the requirements of the valid laws of the state in which
such property is situated .... ,"I65 Nonetheless, Section 959(b) does
not support the majority conclusion because it does not apply to a
liquidation proceeding.' 6 6 The terms "manage and operate" make
the section applicable only to a Chapter 11 reorganization.'67
Although it did not construe Section 959(b), the court in In re
Adelphi Hospital Corp.,168 specifically noted that a trustee in a
Chapter 7 proceeding "[I]s in no sense a manager of an institutions
operations . ',169 A trustee, the court stated, is only a fiduciary
of the bankruptcy court who must supervise the debtor and the
estate and liquidate and distribute the estate's assets for the great-
est benefit to the creditors.171 In Quanta, the waste processing fa-
cility was not being operated, but was merely being liquidated to
maximize proceeds. Consequently, under standards enunciated in
Adelphi Hospital Corp., 171 the trustee of Quanta Resources was not
a manager. Although a trustee may be authorized under certain
circumstances to continue to conduct business with respect to the
property, the trustee's sole function in Quanta was to liquidate the
assets. 172
Both the Supreme Court and the appellate court conceded that
164. 124 Cong. Rec. 11,092 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional rights of the House Committee on the Judici-
ary), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6436, 6444-45.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982).
166. See J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 66.04(4) at 1913 (2d. ed. 1982)
("But § 959(b) applies only to the receiver in his operation of the property in his posses-
sion. It does not apply to the distribution of the estate."). Cf. In re Adelphi Hospital
Corp., 579 F.2d 726, 729 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (in pre-Code liquidation pro-
ceeding the trustee "[I]s in no sense a manager of an institution's operations."). See also
Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, for the Eastern District of Arkansas, 647
F.2d 768, 778 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); Austrian v. Williams,
216 F.2d 278, 285 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 953 (1955).
167. See infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
168. 579 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1978).
169. Id. at 729 n.6.
170. Id.
171. Id. Brief for Trustee at 12, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805). The Quanta
Resources trustee did not operate the waste processing facility as a waste processing facil-
ity. Rather, the facility was merely a part of the Debtor's estate being liquidated to pay
creditors.
172. Adelphi Hospital, 579 F.2d 726.
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Section 959(b) was not independently sufficient to compel the
trustee to clean up the site before abandoning it. 7 3 The court of
appeals, following a lengthy analysis of the section, concluded that
the section was not an independent bar to the trustee's exercise of
the abandonment power when such abandonment was in contra-
vention of state law.'74 The Supreme Court also acknowledged
that the section was not directly applicable to abandonment under
section 554(a) of the Code and "therefore does not delimit the pre-
cise conditions on abandonment."' 7 5 The Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals' maintain that Congress did not intend to
preempt state law when section 554 of the Code is applied in a
Chapter 7 proceeding.1 76 Nevertheless, the Court's own acknowl-
edgements that section 959(b) is not directly applicable to section
554 of the Code, together with the logical construction of section
959(b), render the section unsupportive of such an argument. 177
Moreover, abandonment does not violate the state environmen-
tal laws that section 959(b) seeks to assure are not violated. Both
the applicable New York and New Jersey environmental protec-
tion statutes were drafted to prevent the disposal or discharge of a
hazardous substance into the environment. 7 ' New York law pro-
hibits the knowing or reckless disposal of hazardous waste 79 and
New Jersey law prohibits the act of discharging hazardous sub-
stances. 80 Thus, in order to violate these statutes, the trustee's ac-
tion of abandoning contaminated property must involve or be
equated with the actual disposal or discharge of hazardous
waste.' In Quanta, neither the trustee nor the debtor's creditors'
173. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 761-62 ; In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 919
(3d Cir. 1984).
174. In re Quanta, 739 F.2d at 919.
175. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 761-62. The Court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) only as
support for its contention that Congress did not intend the Code to preempt all state law
that may constrain the trustee. Id.
176. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 759; In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 918.
177. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent in Quanta, also rejected the majority's
reliance on section 959(b), particularly in light of the Court's own concession that the
section does not directly apply to section 554(a) of the Code. Id. at 766 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Further, the dissent asserted that the trustee's filing of an abandonment peti-
tion did not constitute management or operation of the property as required by section
959(b). Id.
178. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
179. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-2711,-2713 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1987).
180. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11c (West 1982).
181. In New York the concept of abandonment must be equated with knowingly or
recklessly "discharg[ing], dispos[ing], or plac[ing] . . . " of the hazardous waste where it
might enter the environment. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2702 (McKinney 1984
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actions constituted a "disposal" as statutorily defined. 8 2  The
trustee never took title to the property, and upon abandoning it,
stood as if he never had an interest in it. 183 The trustee's sole act of
taking custody of the property containing hazardous waste for pur-
poses of liquidating a debtor's estate and then abandoning cannot
be considered an affirmative act of disposing hazardous waste into
the environment. Instead, any disposal or discharge is a result of
the debtor's pre-petition conduct. 184 Thus, abandonment merely
leaves pre-petition violations unrepaired, it does not amount to a
discharge of hazardous waste by the trustee. 185
C. The Bildisco Decision
A further flaw in the Quanta Court's reasoning is found in its
application of the holding in National Labor Relations Board v.
Bildisco & Bildisco.86 The Quanta majority cited Bildisco for the
proposition that a debtor is not relieved of all non-bankruptcy obli-
gations merely by filing a petition in bankruptcy.'87 In Bildisco, a
debtor in possession requested permission from the bankruptcy
court, pursuant to section 365 of the Code, to reject its collective
bargaining agreement with a labor union. 88 The parties had
agreed that the unexpired collective bargaining agreement was an
executory contract, and pursuant to section 365 of the Code, the
& Supp. 1987). In New Jersey the concept of abandonment must be equated with an act
resulting in the "[r]eleasing, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or
dumping" of the hazardous waste into the environment. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-
23.1 lb(h) (West 1982).
182. Although it is beyond the scope of this note to consider possible creditor liability
under federal environmental legislation, it is important to note that recent cases involving
such legislation are suggesting that a lender or other creditor may be liable for clean-up
costs if they are an "owner" or "operator" of a contaminated facility. See United States
v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280 (E.D. Pa. September 6, 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank
and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). See also infra note 231.
183. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
184. It would be a different matter if the trustee had actually operated the property in
his possession whereby the post-petition operation resulted in the violation of environ-
mental laws.
185. Brief for Trustee at 23-24, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986) (Nos. 84-801, 84-805). Individuals
responsible for placing the hazardous material at the site remain subject to criminal liabil-
ity. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dis-
senting). Moreover, because the trustee does not take title to the assets he is not the
owner of the assets. Accordingly, a trustee should not be held liable under laws that hold
property owners liable for discharge of hazardous waste.
186. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
187. Quanta, 106 S. Ct. at 760.
188. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 518.
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trustee could reject it. 89 The bankruptcy court approved the
trustee's rejection and the district court affirmed the decision.1 9°
The labor union then filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the debtor.191 The National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB")
found a violation of the National Labor Relations Act construing
the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement as a unilateral
change of the terms of the agreement. 19 2 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the collective bargaining
agreement could be rejected if the debtor was able to show that the
agreement was burdensome to the estate and if the equities favored
rejection.' 93 The Supreme Court in Bildisco affirmed the appellate
court's decision.'94 The Court held that the language of section
365 of the Code included all executory contracts except those ex-
pressly exempted. 95 The Court further concluded that Congress
knew how to draft an exclusion and its failure to do so indicated
that Congress intended collective bargaining agreements to fall
within the section. 196
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco, Con-
gress amended the Code, adding section 1113.97 This section pro-
vides for the exclusion of collective bargaining agreements from
section 365 of the Code, an interpretation the Bildisco Court would
not infer. '98
Congress' reaction to Bildisco provides one plausible explanation
for the Quanta Court's interpretation of section 554(a) of the Code.
The Court apparently read a qualification into an otherwise un-
qualified statute in anticipation of Congress' reaction to a contrary
decision. It is not the judiciary's role, however, to interpret a stat-
ute on the basis of an expected response by Congress. Instead, a
court may look only to existing evidence of Congressional intent.'9 9
V. IMPLICATIONS
The effect of the Court's decision is the subordination of the
189. Id. at 521-22. Section 365 of the Code allows a trustee, after court approval, to
assume or reject executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
190. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 518.
191. Id. at 518.
192. Id. at 518-19.
193. Id. at 519-21.
194. Id. at 517.
195. Id. at 521.
196. Id. at 522-23.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. III 1985).
198. Id. See also Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
199. Doski v. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1332 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Code to state environmental laws in the interest of public health
and safety. On the surface, this is certainly an admirable result.
Its ramifications, however, reach beyond the limited issue ad-
dressed by the Court in Quanta. Because a court should address
only the issues before it, a court often fails to consider peripheral
issues and the impact of its decisions. Conversely, when Congress
legislates, it may raise and consider all issues prior to the enact-
ment of a statute. In its interpretation of section 554 of the Code
the Court failed to consider that the trustees and lower courts
charged with implementing the decision are left without guidance
regarding the manner in which this should be done. Thus far,
lower courts have inconsistently interpreted a trustee's duties re-
garding clean up of contaminated property prior to abandon-
ment.200 Additionally, the lower courts have inconsistently
determined what source of money is to be used for cleanup costs. 2°1
A. Scope of the Holding
Following the Third Circuit decision in Quanta, bankruptcy
courts inconsistently interpreted the holding. Some courts strictly
adhered to the opinion and denied abandonment; 20 2 others rejected
the decision completely.20 3 Still other courts avoided the decision
by distinguishing the facts of the cases before them from those in
Quanta.2°  Following the Supreme Court's Quanta decision, bank-
ruptcy court decisions reflect continued confusion regarding the re-
view of trustees' abandonment petitions.20 5
The decision in In re Commercial Oil Service, Inc. ,26 is illustra-
tive of this confusion. In that case, the bankruptcy court dismissed
a Chapter 7 filing because the court determined that the Quanta
holding made the trustee responsible for the cleanup of hazardous
materials illegally stored at the debtor's property. 20 7 The court dis-
200. See infra notes 202-30 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 231-49 and accompanying text.
202. Matter of National Smelting of New Jersey, Inc., 49 Bankr. 1012 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1985) (court followed Quanta and rejected abandonment).
203. In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 50 Bankr. 790 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (court rejected
Quanta and allowed abandonment of the polluted property); In re Union Scrap Iron &
Metal Co., 49 Bankr. 477 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (court rejected Quanta and allowed
abandonment where there were no unencumbered assets available to pay for the cleanup).
204. In re A & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. D. Wy. 1985) (court
distinguished Quanta and approved abandonment in a no asset chapter 7 proceeding; the
court found no violation of the state law by the act of abandonment).
205. See infra notes 206-30 and accompanying text.
206. 58 Bankr. 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
207. Id. at 317. The court found that the Supreme Court opinion in Ohio v. Kovacs,
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missed the case to avoid this consequence, stating that "the trustee
who is unfamiliar with the hazardous waste disposal should not
bear such an onerous burden. 2°8
In In re Oklahoma Refining Co.,209 the bankruptcy court
presented a different interpretation of the Quanta holding. The es-
tate contained no unencumbered assets that could be used to clean
up the debtor's polluted property. 210  The court noted that the
trustee faced a "formidable dilemma", but stated that a strict read-
ing of Quanta called for compliance with state environmental laws
and regulations.21' The bankruptcy court, however, rejected such
a strict interpretation and instead interpreted Quanta as requiring
the bankruptcy court to regard state environmental laws and regu-
lations as one factor in deciding whether to approve the abandon-
ment petition.21 2 The court in Oklahoma Refining reasoned that
strict compliance with state environmental laws could create "a
bankruptcy case in perpetuity" because a trustee lacking adequate
assets to meet state law requirements could not abandon the prop-
erty and the estate could not be closed.213 The court, therefore,
concluded that, because the site did not present an immediate
harm to public health or safety, as in Quanta, abandonment would
not aggravate the existing situation.21 4
Similarly, in In re Franklin Signal Corp. ,215 the bankruptcy court
permitted abandonment of fourteen drums containing hazardous
chemicals.21 6 The estate contained essentially no assets.217 In ana-
lyzing whether abandonment was appropriate, the bankruptcy
469 U.S. 274 (1985), also required state law compliance by the trustee. Commercial Oil,
58 Bankr. at 317.
208. Commercial Oil, 58 Bankr. at 317. The possible personal liability of a trustee is
another concern left unaddressed by the Court. If a trustee does not have sufficient re-
sources to comply with state law the result could be criminal liability. This will surely
have a negative effect on the trustee program. See In re Charles George Land Reclama-
tion Trust, 30 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (no private party would agree to serve
as trustee).
209. 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
210. Id. at 563.
211. Id. at 565. The issue of whether section 554(a) of the Code may be limited by all
state health and police power laws, or only those relating to toxic waste and environmen-
tal protection, was also not addressed by the Court, and remains unresolved.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
216. Id. at 274. The court relied on the broad reading of Quanta given by the court
in In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). Franklin
Signal, 65 Bankr. at 274.
217. 65 Bankr. at 269-70.
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court determined that the Supreme Court did not intend to restrict
all abandonment that contravenes state law. Rather, abandonment
could not be approved by the court until the trustee attempted to
protect the public health and welfare by undertaking "adequate
precautionary measures. ' 21 8 Accordingly, the Franklin Signal
court suggested several factors a bankruptcy court should consider
in evaluating whether a trustee may abandon property.21 9 First,
the court must determine whether there is imminent danger to the
public health and safety. Second, the court must evaluate the ex-
tent of probable harm to the public and the environment. Third,
the court must consider the amount and type of hazardous waste.
Finally, the court must examine the cost to bring the property into
compliance with environmental laws and the amount and type of
funds available for cleanup. 220 In Franklin Signal,22' the court
found that the trustee met the minimum conditions to permit aban-
donment.222 The court distinguished the case from Quanta by not-
ing that the issue under consideration was not one of public safety,
but one of money and who must pay the cleanup costs. 2 23
In direct contradiction to In re Franklin Signal Corp. 224 are the
cases of In re Stevens 225 and In re Peerless Plating Co..226 Those
cases held that abandonment could not be approved until the
trustee brought the property into full compliance with relevant
state and federal environmental laws.227 The court in Peerless Plat-
ing, however, did advocate a narrow construction of the exception
to unconditional abandonment. 22  The court noted that a trustee
may abandon property contaminated with hazardous waste under
three circumstances. 229 First, if the environmental laws in question
were so onerous that they interfered with the bankruptcy adjudica-
tion, abandonment would be approved. Second, abandonment
would be approved if the environmental laws were not reasonably
218. Id. at 271-72.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
222. Id. at 273.
223. Id. at 274. The court found that the drums containing hazardous waste in-
volved no imminent threat to public health. Id. Whether this is a distinguishing factor is
questionable. Clearly Quanta also involved the issue of who pays for cleanup. See infra
notes 228-43 and accompanying text.
224. 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
225. 68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987).
226. 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
227. Stevens, 68 Bankr. at 781; Peerless Plating, 70 Bankr. at 946.
228. 70 Bankr. 943, 946-47.
229. Id. at 947.
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designed to protect the public health and safety from identified
hazards. Finally, abandonment would be permitted if the violation
caused by abandonment would merely be speculative or
indeterminate. 230
In summary, the Supreme Court's opinion in Quanta did not
provide guidelines for trustees or bankruptcy courts required to
evaluate the trustees' decisions. The Court's holding has led to
confusion. The decision has made it necessary for Congress to bal-
ance the goals of the Code against those of environmental legisla-
tion. At this time, the bankruptcy courts must determine what
constitutes "adequate precautionary measures" and how the es-
tates, with varying amounts of assets, are to fund the measures.
These issues were left unaddressed by the Court in Quanta.
B. Who Pays?
One of the key issues left unresolved following the Quanta deci-
sion is how the debtor's estate will bear the cost of cleanup. Ensur-
ing that the estate continues to hold title to property not in
compliance with environmental regulations does not ensure that
funds will be available to pay for cleanup. When there is no actual
or potential equity in the property of the estate, the only source of
funding appears to be the public coffers.2 3 1 The Quanta decision,
230. Id.
231. The Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA") Pub. L. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613, provides for emergency response to and enforcement of cleanup of
dangerous conditions caused by past or present hazardous contamination of the environ-
ment. Further, CERCLA imposes liability on a wide range of individuals, most notably
the "owner" or "operator" of the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9707 (1982). Recent court deci-
sions have construed this provision to include those who control but do not own the
facility and entities whose ownership is passive. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (present owner held liable although its actions did not
contribute to the environmental problem); United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust
Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (lender who purchased contaminated property at
foreclosure sale held liable); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal,
Inc., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20895 (D. S.C. August 24, 1984) (passive
lessee/sublessor held liable); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20698 (D. S.C. June 15, 1984) (firm that acted as a conduit in transfer of a legal
title which it held for one hour held liable); United States v. Argent Corp., 14 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20616 (D. N.M. May 4, 1984) (passive owner/lessor held liable).
The result of these cases is that an unwary lender or other creditor may become a source
of cleanup funding. Although these cases all involve violations of federal environmental
legislation, state laws which parallel the federal law could be analyzed similarly by the
state courts.
For example, New York has established the Hazardous Waste Removal Fund, N.Y.
STATE FIN. LAW § 97-b (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). This fund is similar to the
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however, lends no guidance regarding how this issue should be
resolved. 232
1. Administrative Expenses
An estate's assets are often insufficient to pay all creditors in full.
In such situations, the Code accords a priority of payment of all
administrative expenses.233 Administrative expenses are defined as
expenses incurred to preserve the estate.234 Thus, for an expense to
qualify as administrative, it must benefit the estate.2 35  Cleanup
costs may be categorized as administrative expenses if a trustee op-
erated the debtor's property to the benefit of the estate in violation
federal superfund in providing state funds for emergency cleanup. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW
§ 97-b (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). It is also similar to the federal legislation because
both owners and operators of the site could be held liable for cleanup costs. N.Y. ENVT'L
CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). New York's fund does not,
however, establish a "super-priority" property lien. The term "super-priority" is not a
codified term. As the name implies, super-priority means that the lien would be paid off
first in the distribution of the assets of the estate.
232. The result of the Court's opinion in Quanta is that application of state environ-
mental statutes holds the trustee and the estate liable for the debtor's pre-petition conduct
when application of the Code would not do so. The court itself, however, previously
acknowledged that the Code did not intend such a result. In its decision in Ohio v. Ko-
vacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284-85 n.12 (1985), the Court, when discussing the "usual duties" of a
bankruptcy trustee, noted that
[i]f the site at issue were [the debtor's] property the trustee would shortly deter-
mine whether it was of value to the estate. If the property was worth more than
the costs of bringing it into compliance with state law the trustee would un-
doubtedly sell it for its net value and the buyer would clean up the property, in
which event whatever obligation [the debtor] might have had to clean up the
property would have been satisfied. If the property were worth less than the
cost of cleanup, the trustee would likely abandon it to its prior owner, who
would have to comply with the state environmental law to the extent of his or
its ability.
The Court did not indicate who must pay for the cleanup. Because the trustee is prohib-
ited from abandoning the property he must expend assets of the estate to bring the prop-
erty into compliance with state law. These assets rightfully belong to the creditors of the
estate. Although creditors normally bear the risk that their security may be less valuable
than anticipated, they generally have no expectation that they will be liable to the extent
of their investment for a debtor corporation's violations of the law. This is especially true
as to laws which arose after credit was extended to a debtor. Arguably, creditors now
have notice of possible liability when lending to entities which are connected with hazard-
ous waste. Nevertheless, the effect of requiring the creditors to bear the loss is that less
credit may be extended to companies who might have any connection with environmen-
tally endangering products. There is not evidence that Congress intended or would ac-
cept this result. In fact, Congress drafted the Code to avoid such a result by allowing the
trustee to abandon burdensome property. See also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
233. II U.S.C.§ 507(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
234. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). It is inappropriate to catego-
rize costs or expenses arising from pre-petition conduct as administrative expenses be-
cause, by definition, they must arise after commencement of the case. Id.
235. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 503.03 at 503-15 (L. King 15th ed. 1986).
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of environmental laws, and as a result, the state had to perform
and fund the cleanup. Cleanup costs also could be categorized as
administrative expenses if the cleanup was beneficial in some other
way to the trustee in his liquidation of the estate. The expenditure
of the estate's assets by the Quanta Resources trustee to clean up
the hazardous waste contamination would benefit the public at the
expense of the creditors. Therefore, the states' reimbursement
claims should not be given administrative expense priority.
Rather, they should be satisfied in accordance with section 726 of
the Code concerning distribution of the property of the estate.236
Because the Quanta majority failed to lend guidance regarding
the proper characterization of the cleanup costs, courts are catego-
rizing these costs as administrative expenses.237 In In re T.P. Long
Chemical, Inc.,23s the court held that the debtor's liability to the
Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") for cleanup costs
was an administrative expense.239 The costs were incurred to rem-
edy the post-petition release of hazardous substances and the es-
tate's unsecured assets were insufficient to cover the costs. 24 °
Therefore, the EPA requested payment from the proceeds of the
sale of the property subject to a secured creditor's lien. 241 The
court concluded that the EPA's cleanup did not confer a benefit on
236. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
237. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. But see Southern Railway Co. v.
Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985) (cleanup costs were not allowed as
administrative expenses) (case decided before the Supreme Court's Quanta opinion was
issued); In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 56 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(court denied administrative expense characterization for cleanup costs because such a
characterization would give governmental entities incentive to delay cleanup) (case de-
cided before the Supreme Court's Quanta opinion was issued). Because administrative
expenses are not generally satisfied out of secured assets, when the debtor has many se-
cured debts, it is questionable whether administrative claim status would be sufficient to
give recovery. See Matter of Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982). Adminis-
trative expenses should not be confused with § 506(c) expenses. Section 506(c) of the
Code allows for the recovery from proceeds of secured property of the necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the property to the extent of benefit to the security holder. 11
U.S.C. § 506(c)(1982 & Supp III 1985) (emphasis added).
238. 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
239. The court based its decision on the conclusion that the estate could not avoid the
liability imposed by a federal statute because of the Third Circuit's decision in Quanta.
Therefore, such costs were actual and necessary to the estate. Id. at 286-87. See also In
re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (post-petition cleanup
expenses of pre-petition environmental hazard classified as administrative expenses); In re
Mowbray Engineering Co., Inc., 67 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (EPA was al-
lowed decontamination costs as administrative expenses).
240. TP. Long Chemical, 45 Bankr. at 281.
241. Id. at 287. The EPA based its request on § 506(c) of the Code, which allows a
trustee to recover certain administrative expenses from secured property. Id. See supra
note 237.
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the secured creditor. Thus, the EPA could not recover its costs
from the property that was subject to a creditor's lien, notwith-
standing that such costs amounted to administrative expenses.242
Recently, in In re Stevens,243 the United States District Court for
the District of Maine also held that the costs of post-petition
cleanup of a pre-petition environmental hazard could be recovered
as an administrative expense. 244  The court concluded that the
Quanta decision implied an exception to the general rule that
bankruptcy courts have no authority to elevate a pre-petition claim
to an administrative priority. 245 The court found that Quanta
changed the criteria for determining the allowance of administra-
tive expenses under the Code.246 The court also relied on the deci-
sion in TP. Long Chemical247 and concluded that, because the
trustee could not abandon the polluted property, cleanup remained
the responsibility of the estate.24s The court did not consider
whether a security interest could be destroyed or where the admin-
istrative funds would come from in a no-asset estate case.249
242. T P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. at 289-90. But see In re Distrigas Corp.,
66 Bankr. 382 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (administrative expense claim for clean-up costs
could be given priority ahead of prior secured creditors, if necessary).
243. 68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987).
244. Id. at 783.
245. Id. at 780.
246. Id. The court reached this conclusion even though the Court in Quanta never
addressed the issue.
247. 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
248. Stevens, 68 Bankr. at 780.
249. The fifth amendment of the Constitution allows for the taking of private prop-
erty if the owner receives "just compensation". U.S. CONST. amend. V. In the Quanta
case, the Third Circuit dismissed any Takings Clause issue in a footnote by reasoning that
because the states were enforcing their environmental protection laws pursuant to their
police power, there was no Taking Clause issue. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
912, 922 n. 11. (3d Cir. 1984). In arriving at such a conclusion, the court of appeals failed
to consider previous Supreme Court opinions, which held that a taking may still occur
notwithstanding a valid exercise of a state's police power. Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beck-
with, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980). See also, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1016
(1984). The Supreme Court in Quanta did not address the issue. Nevertheless, the prac-
tice is arguably unconstitutional. To require a trustee in bankruptcy to administer and
clean up valueless property and exhaust all assets of the estate which would otherwise be
available for distribution to creditors holding a duly perfected security interest constitutes
an uncompensated taking. The Supreme Court previously has stated that the public in-
terest cannot require the use of assets of the debtor's estate which results in a confiscation
of practically the entire estate because such a confiscation is adverse to the Takings
Clause. In re New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 330 F. Supp. 131, 147
(D. Conn. 1971) (contained operation of a railroad). See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note
4, at 423, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6379 (referring to the
provision codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1169 (1982). The Supreme Court stated that no matter
how great the public need, private property cannot be taken even for wholly public use
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2. Dismissal
Assuming that the trustee cannot abandon the property and the
secured creditors' security cannot be used, the question of who
pays for the cleanup remains unanswered. Finding no one to pay,
one court solved this problem by dismissing the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, leaving it up to the debtor and its creditors to work out
the situation on their own.25° In In re Commercial Oil Services,
Inc. ,25l the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Ohio dis-
missed a Chapter 7 case because it was impossible for the trustee to
manage the waste disposal site in compliance with state law.252
This result was unfair and inconsistent with the Code's objectives.
A debtor should not be denied relief under the Code because he
could not afford to pay his debts. This is contrary to the basic
precepts of bankruptcy law.253
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Quanta effectively precludes orderly liq-
uidation of a debtor's estate when a debtor is obliged, after filing a
petition in bankruptcy, to comply with certain other federal or
state statutes.2 54 The Court reached its decision even though the
Code indicates no legislative intent to deny such a debtor the rights
and protections of the Code.
Abandonment by the trustee is not hostile to the states' rights to
assert non-priority liens against the abandoned property or to pur-
sue claims for reimbursement against the estate. It permits state
agencies to proceed with necessary clean up and to pursue all rem-
edies available to them under the Code. 255 Furthermore, environ-
without just compensation and that the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest
must be paid by the public. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555,
602 (1935). Because the Court avoided the entire Takings Clause issue, it provided no
guidance regarding just compensation for a destroyed security interest.
250. In re Commercial Oil Services, Inc., 58 Bankr. 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
251. Id.
252. Id. Accord In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (case decided before the Supreme Court's Quanta opinion was
issued). Section 707 of the Code empowers the court to dismiss a bankruptcy case for
cause shown. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The issue of cause is within the
bankruptcy court's discretion. In re Heatley, 51 Bankr. 518, 519 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
See II U.S.C. § 1112 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) as to dismissal of a Chapter II case.
253. The Code states when a Chapter 7 proceeding may be dismissed. 11 U.S.C.
§ 707 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Failure by the debtor to pay pre-petition debts is not
included among the provisions.
254. The Quanta decision also may destroy all possibilities of an effective reorganiza-
tion by draining all of the assets of the estate to fund a cleanup.
255. The states may file any unsecured pre-petition claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C,
1242 [Vol. 18
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mental policy is not advanced by leaving hazardous waste sites
under the control of a trustee in bankruptcy because the trustee
often cannot even afford to maintain a security guard at the site, let
alone finance a cleanup of the property. Instead of restricting
abandonment, individual state legislatures or Congress should en-
act legislation preventing the utilization of the Code by a debtor to
avoid liability for cleanup costs of toxic waste hazards.
Application of the Code mandates that, absent Congressional
amendment, the state is a general creditor with a pre-petition claim
for cleanup expenses.25 6 In holding that state and local toxic waste
disposal laws are not preempted by section 554(a) of the Code, the
Court has superimposed a judicially-created police power excep-
tion to common law abandonment on the trustee in lieu of the fed-
erally codified power to abandon burdensome property of the
debtor's estate. It is not the role of the courts to substitute their
judgment for that of the legislature. The Court's opinion in
Quanta , therefore, represents an unconstitutional usurption of the
legislature's power.
JILL C. KoSMIN
§ 501 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985). The states may have a secured claim as well. See supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
256. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson
Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 139-40 (3d Cir. 1985).
1987] 1243

